1.
Governed for the past 22 years by the former communist
leader Islam Karimov, Uzbekistan remains one of the most repressive states in
the world[1].
The country has no legal opposition or independent media. Civil society and
religious communities are subject to severe pressure from the side of the
authorities. Political repression is an inherent part of government policy.
Torture is practiced systematically. Indeed, the number of political prisoners
in Uzbekistan is considerably higher than in all the other former Soviet
republics put together.
2.
The practice of mass-repression introduced and sanctioned by President Islam
Karimov in 1990s continues to this day. Several thousand political prisoners
are held in Uzbekistan’s prison camps. The majority of these persons have been
sentenced in dubious cases related to terrorism, Islamic extremism and illegal
religious activities. More than 1200 people are currently wanted by the
authorities on similar charges. According to incomplete figures, no less than
868 people were sentenced in politically motivated criminal cases in the period
between 2009 and 2010, while hundreds were subject to arbitrary detention.
“Black lists” are becoming still more widespread and include tens of thousands
of inhabitants of the country, who are under potential threat of criminal
persecution. The level of repression in Uzbekistan increased noticeably in the
same period, probably exceeding even the high levels of repression in the
period between 2004 and 2006.
3.
The Criminal Code of Uzbekistan, which was adopted in 1994, contains provisions
that are incompatible with the freedoms set out in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights of 1966. In particular, any religious activity
not sanctioned by the government is criminalized. Strict punishment is set out
(up to 15 years imprisonment) for “extremism” and participation in “forbidden
organizations”, in spite of these two terms having no basis in national
legislation. This opens up for arbitrary interpretation of the terms. The
definition of “terrorism” is unnecessarily wide, extending the circles of
people who may be charged with this crime. A number of articles in the Criminal
Code do not sufficiently differentiate between the qualification and punishment
of practical preparation or carrying out of a violent act on one hand, and the
expression of an opinion on the other, as well as between direct and indirect
participation in a crime. The
provisions
regarding defamation
and insults against
the people and president of Uzbekistan can be used to
punish individuals who express opinions critical of the regime.
4.
As in the past, the current practice in criminal cases shows that a great number
of Muslims whose activities pose no threat to the social order and security are
being sentenced on fabricated charges of terrorism and extremism. The use of
torture in 2009-2010 continued to have a systematic character. Admissions that
had been coerced from suspects under pressure often served as the main evidence
of guilt. Administrative arrest of 10-15 days during arbitrary detention of
suspects was practiced. During investigation and trial there were numerous
procedural violations. Access to a lawyer was limited. Many political cases in
2009-2010 were considered in closed hearings, and usually only
government-appointed lawyers were allowed to participate in the processes. In
many cases, contact between the suspect and his family members was prohibited after
the arrest. The courts handed out long prison sentences to persons whose guilt
merely consisted of unofficial studies of Islam, keeping religious materials or
being associated with “forbidden” organizations and movements, some of which
openly carry out their activities in democratic countries. There were also
numerous incidents when political prisoners (both religious and non-religious)
were sentenced to renewed prison terms – usually on dubious charges of
disobeying the administration of the penitentiary institution where they were
being held.
5.
The main enemy of the state in 2009-2010 was announced to be “zhikhodchilar” (“Jihadists”). This term, which is used as a
political label, includes members of a few terrorist groups, as well as
participants in various informal Islamic associations who supposedly express
“radical views”, or who keep or distribute audio and video clips of sermons of
well-known religious figures who are persecuted by the authorities. As before,
persons accused of being involved with Hizb-ut-Tahrir
made up the majority of political prisoners, although their numbers were small
among those who were sentenced on politically motivated charges in the period
2009-2010. Followers of Said Nursi, “Tablig”, “Vakhabists” and some
other local movements and groups were also actively persecuted under charges of
involvement in “forbidden organizations”.
6.
Apart from the case of the terrorist attacks in Andijan in May 2009 (the attack
on a road block in Khanabad and two suicide bombers) there is no information to
indicate that any known foreign Jihadist organizations were involved in
planning or carrying out violent acts in Uzbekistan over the past two years. It
is highly likely that the numerous criminal cases that were investigated in
Uzbekistan in 2009-2010 contained no information of a connection between local
“Jihadists” with organizations such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
or the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU).
7.
Authorities in Uzbekistan explain their harsh measures against “extremists”
with the need to keep stability and to protect society against threats of
violence from radical Islamic groups. However, repression does not only affect
marginal groups, but has become part of everyday life in Uzbekistan, turning
into an important source of socio-political tension. In spite of the absence of
a strong opposition inside the country and the extremely limited contacts
between local groups and foreign Jihadists, the system itself is constantly
provoking and creating crisis. Also, the refusal of the authorities to explain
to society their actions related to the fight against terrorism is evidence
that authorities are themselves not convinced that this practice would gain
support among the population. In contrast to the optimistic image presented in
official media, the suppression of religious and political dissent combined
with the most authoritarian methods of governing, the total corruption,
inefficient economy and absence of social justice helps feed into the
increasingly common conviction that positive changes in society can only be
brought about through the use of force. This creates a basis for the
strengthening of the position of Jihadist groups.
8. It is a well-known fact that the repression of independent human rights defenders and journalists was intensified after the Andijan events of 2005, largely because of the role that civil society played in spreading information about this conflict. Severe pressure on civil society continues to this day. Also, some criminal cases also bear witness not only of the authorities’ intolerance of dissent, but also of their fear that any alternative information may stimulate an inclination towards protests among the population.
9.
Most likely, the same reasons may explain the almost complete lack of official
information about violent incidents in the Andijan region and Tashkent in
May-September 2009 that were widely discussed among the population. It would
seem that authorities are afraid that even a limited success among the
Jihadists could become an example to follow and cause new anti-government
groups to appear inside the country.
10.
The West, as well as Uzbekistan’s partners in the CIS, does not sufficiently
appreciate the seriousness and the scale of the problems connected to political
repression in Uzbekistan and their potentially dramatic influence on regional
stability. In contrast to the period 2002-2003, human rights dialogues raise
the question of political prisoners only with reference to some 30 activists
from civil society and the democratic opposition, and any releases among these
are welcomed as “positive change”. In fact, these prisoners are used as
hostages in political bargaining with the West, and their places are almost
immediately filled by newly sentenced prisoners. At the same time, thousands of
political prisoners are still in prison or are subject to harsh and
discriminating treatment because of their connection to Islam. Many of them are
convinced that the international community is not taking sufficient measures to
change the situation. On 27 October 2009, while the level of repression in
Uzbekistan was reaching a new high, the European Union decided to remove the
sanctions which were imposed on the country after the Andijan events in 2005.
This appeared as an act of approval of the repressive policies of President
Islam Karimov. The same symbolic meaning was evident in the meeting between
Karimov and the Chairman of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Barroso in
Brussels in January 2011.
11.
The current real politic of the US
and the European Union in relation to Uzbekistan is in need of reconsideration,
especially in the context of recent events in the Middle East, which may be
repeated in Central Asia (in the case of Uzbekistan the violent scenario seen
in Libya is more likely than the head of the government resigning voluntarily,
as seen in Egypt). Bearing this in mind, it is necessary that the subject of
political prisoners in Uzbekistan is raised as a topic of concern and is
discussed on the international level.
Some
of the concluding remarks of the UN Committee on Human Rights during the 3rd
Periodical Review of Uzbekistan in March 2010 are important, but insufficient
steps in that direction.
External
factors are a key element influencing the level of suppression of dissent
inside the country. It is necessary to bring about respect for the
international commitments of Uzbekistan in the sphere of human rights, both on
the level of individual cases, as well as on the level of legislative reform
(criminal and criminal-procedural law, and laws that regulate religious
activities and the fight against terrorism), the prevention of torture and
observation of procedural guarantees.
Even
if these measures were not to have any fast effect, they are important as a way
of strengthening the idea of democracy inside the region and as moral support
of those who are trying to have the cases of victims of unfounded persecution
re-considered.
It
is worth mentioning that in the period of active co-operation with the USA in
2001-2003, Uzbekistan annually freed up to 1000 political prisoners, something
which did not cause any problems in terms of stability in the domestic
political situation, but quite on the contrary, helped decrease the level of
tension in society.
It is also necessary to recognize that a continued “war on Islam” under
the guise of the fight against terrorism which was unleashed by Islam Karimov
already in the 1990s, may have catastrophic consequences for Central Asia. The
practice of mass repression does not only clearly violate the international
commitments of Uzbekistan in the sphere of human rights, but also represents a
threat to social security and stability in the region, and is an inadequate
response to the attempts at recruitment to terrorist groups.
[1] Uzbekistan
ranks as number 164 out of 167 countries on the Economist Intelligence Unit’s
Democracy Index, outranked only by Turkmenistan, Chad and North Korea.
Similarly, Freedom House lists the country amongst the nine least free
countries in the world.